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Abstract
C a s o n( 1 9 9 3 )a r g u e dt h a tt h ea u c t i o nt h eE P Au s e di no r d e rt os t a r tt h e
market for sulfur allowances, is not ef¿cient. The set-up of the auction
gives both buyers and sellers an incentive to understate their valuation of an
allowance. In this paper, we show that the sellers’ incentives are even more
perverse than Cason suggested. In particular, we show that sellers have an
incentive to set their ask price equal to zero, while simultaneously hedging
their bets by submitting a positive bid. It is not possible to derive the Nash
equilibrium for this set-up. If such an equilibrium exists, sellers either set
only a positive ask price, or an ask price equal to zero, and a positive bid as
well.
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11. Introduction
Since Dales (1968), economists have recommended tradeable permits as an ef¿cient
instrument of environmental policy. However, the development of this instrument in
policy practice has been slow. In the 1970s, emissions trading rules emerged in the
US. Because there was no conscious design, the rules were unclear and controversial
and required a lot of government intervention (Liroff 1986).
In 1990, the ¿rst large-scale, consciously designed emission trading scheme was
introduced in the US. It was applied to the SO2 emissions of electric utilities.1 In
Phase I (1995-2000), a limited number of electric utilities participate in the scheme.
In Phase II (from 2000), all electric utilities will participate.
Sulfur allowances can be traded in two different ways. One way is to trade privately
between utilities, possibly with the intermediation of a broker. By now, the lion’s
share of allowances is traded in this way. The other trading option is the annual
auction in March, organized by the EPA. This auction was ¿r s th e l di n1 9 9 3 .A tt h e
auction, the EPA sells the small part (2.8%) of the total amount of allowances that is
not grandfathered directly to the utilities. The revenues of the auction are distributed
among the allowance holders. Electric utilities and other interested parties can not
only bid at the auction, but also offer allowances for sale.
The way in which the auction is conducted is unique.2 The bids are ranked from
high to low. The allowances from the EPA are sold to the highest bidders. The other
suppliers are ranked according to their ask price, from low to high. The lowest asker
is matched to the highest remaining bidder, etc. as long as the ask price is below the
bid price. A successful bidder pays his bid price to the seller to whom he is matched.
This was the ¿rst time that this auction design was implemented. Also, it had not
been analyzed before. Cason (1993) is the only paper which provides an analysis
of the auction.3 He claims that this auction is inef¿cient, in that the market-clearing
prices are too low and not all gains from trade are exhausted. In a standard uniform
price auction, all trades take place at the market-clearing price, given all bid and ask
prices submitted. In such an auction, buyers have an incentive to bid slightly lower
than their valuation, whereas sellers have an incentive to ask a price that is slightly
1 Ellerman et al. (1997) provide a comprehensive report of the whole program. Schmalensee et
al. (1998) summarize the report. Joskow et al. (1998) discuss the allowance market. Stavins (1998)
discusses the positive and normative lessons from the program.
2 This way of conducting the auction is not explicity laid down in the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments (CAAA). Rather, it is based upon EPA’s interpretation of the CAAA (Cason, 1993).
3 In the remainder of this paper, we will refer to Cason (1993) simply as Cason.
2higher than their valuation(see for example Vickrey, 1961, orMcAfee and McMillan,
1987). This results in an ef¿cient market. In the EPA auction, however, Cason shows
that a seller has an incentive to offer units at prices below her costs. Given that she
will sell, the lower her ask price, the higher the bid to which she will be matched, and
therefore the higher her expected revenue. Given that bidders still have an incentive
to bid below their valuations, this results in biased price signals which may reduce
the ef¿ciency of the market.
However, as we will showin thispaper, Cason’s analysis is incomplete. He only looks
at the ask price that allowance sellers will set. We will show that it may be more
pro¿table for a seller to simultaneously set an ask price equal to zero and submit a
bid. As a result, the seller’s incentives in this auction are even more perverse than
Cason suggested.
We now know that the auction did not live up to its expectations. It was seen as a
“market starter”. The ¿rst auction was held in 1993, whereas the program would start
in 1995. The auction was supposed to give an indication of the allowance price to
be used as a guideline for private trades.4 Furthermore, once the program was under
way, if electric utilities found it dif¿cult to buy or sell at the private market, they
could always resort to the auction.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
As Table 1 shows, the relative importance of the auction has declined through the
years, as has private supply at the auction. In 1993 and 1994, the quantity of private
supply was about the same as the quantity offered by the EPA. However, only up
to two per cent of privately supplied allowances was sold. In 1995, private supply
declined drastically, whereas the sales remained at the same level. In 1996, none of
the private supply was sold. From 1997 on, there has not been any private supply at
the auction.
Despite(orperhapsdueto)thedisappointingperformanceoftheauction,aÀourishing
and ef¿cient private market did develop. We see in Table 1 that the ratio of privately
traded allowances to allowances sold at the auction has risen from 5 in 1994 to 28 in
1997. Therefore, Cason’s fear5 seems to have proven unfounded.
4 In fact, the market-clearing price of the ¿rst EPA auction in 1993 was below the average price of
the scarce private transactions around that time. From 1994 on, the prices on both markets were very
close (See Ellerman et al., 1997, or Schmalensee et al., 1998).
5 “If this highly visible market experiment fails because Congress designed the trading mechanism
3Why should we then want to analyze the EPA auction, now that it has proven to be
a less relevant trading option, at least for private supply? First, there is the intellectual
challengeof¿ndinganequilibriumtothisauction.Second,withabetterunderstanding
o fh o wt h ea u c t i o nw o r k sw em a yb ea b l et oe x p l a i nw h yi tf a i l e dt ob er e l e v a n t .
An auction with a different design might have been a more attractive trading option
and might have given a more reliable price signal to the private market. This is also
relevant for future auctions of tradeable emission permits or other items. Third, we
show that market participants can make money in the EPA auctions by using our
approach rather than the equilibrium strategy derived by Cason.6
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
formal description of the players and the rules of the auction. We also discuss the
equilibrium derived by Cason. In this equilibrium, sellers only set an ask price. In
Section 3, we show that when all other sellers follow Cason’s strategy, any one seller
can achieve a higher payoff by submitting an ask and a bid price, rather than only an
ask price. In section 4 we derive some characteristics of the appropriate equilibrium
in this auction. In particular, we show that in any equilibrium, sellers either submit an
ask price equal to zero, plus a positive bid, or they only submit a positive ask price,
and no bid. In section 5 we sketch the derivation of the appropriate equilibrium, and
show that (at least, for us) it is impossible to solve. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
In this section, we introduce the formal model to analyze the EPA auction, and also
present the solution Cason has given for the equilibrium strategies of the sellers.
Cason makes the following simplifying assumptions. First, assume that sellers offer
only one unit for sale in the auction. Second, the auction is the only way to trade
allowances. Third, we do not take the units offered by the EPA into account. Fourth,
weabstractfromstrategicbuyersbyassumingthatbidsaredrawnfromsomeprobability




. Fifth, both buyers
and sellers are risk neutral.
Suppose we have Q bids. Each of N o Q sellers submits an ask price to sell a
single unit. Random bid prices are unknown when sellers enter their asks. Rank the
poorly, the negative impact on future regulatory policy may extend well beyond federal acid rain
legislation.” (Cason, 1993, p. 178).
6 Cason also conducted a series of experiments to test whether subjects behave in the way described
by his model (Cason 1995, Cason and Plott 1996). In these experiments, however, sellers did not have
the possibility to submit a bid.
4Q bids in decreasing order: b1 o b2 o obQand the N asks in increasing order:
a1 n a2 n aNThe seller asking aj is matched with bid bj and receives a price
equal to bj only if bj o aj Let ci denote the emission compliance cost of seller i
i  1NEach ci is drawn from a known probability distribution function H









 If not, she earns zero. A strictly positive equilibrium ask function
ai  aci can be derived as a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, provided that
c is high enough, as is assumed by Cason.
When determining her optimal ask price ai, the seller must trade off two effects. On
the one hand, a decrease in ai results in a higher expected bid price to which she will
be matched and therefore in a higher expected payoff. However, this is only the case
when the initial ask price was already low enough for a sale to take place. It can also
happen that the initial ask price is too high, and there will not be a sale. Then, when
the seller reduces her ask price, she may succeed in selling her allowance, but will
make a loss when the bid price to which she is matched is below her own cost ci.F o r
a uniform distribution of bids and sellers’ costs, Cason shows that the equilibrium
a s kf u n c t i o nh a sa  c ic iHence, the optimal ask is below the seller’s cost ci and
there is a possibility that, in equilibrium, a seller makes a loss.
3. Why This Is Not An Equilibrium
In this section, we prove that the equilibrium described by Cason, in which every
seller i sets a strictly positive ask ai is no longer a Nash equilibrium if we also allow
sellers to submit a bid price. Indeed, we will show that, in that case, any situation
in which all participating sellers set a strictly positive ask price, does not qualify
as a Nash equilibrium. Every seller can improve by submitting an ask price zero
instead, and submitting a positive bid as well. One way to break the equilibrium is
the following
Theorem 3.1 Any situation in which all participating sellers set a strictly positive
ask price, cannot be a Nash equilibrium, since every seller can strictly improve by
simultaneously submitting an ask price equal to zero, and a bid price equal to her
cost ci
PROOF. Consider the situation described in the theorem, in which all submitted
asks are strictly positive. For ease of exposition, we will refer to the strategy used
in this case by seller i as the strictly positive strategy. The agents in the auction
5submit Q bids, given, in descending order, by b1   b2    bQ 7￿8 We sort
all asks in ascending order, and de¿ne r as the rank of some seller i’s ask. Thus
0  a1  a2 a r￿1 a r a r￿1,w h e r ea r is the ask submitted by seller
i We will show that seller i is better off using the alternative strategy described in
theorem 3.1, rather than the strictly positive strategy.




j : bj  aj
k
 (1)
If seller i sells her allowance, she will receive an amount br, which is the bid matched
to her ask ar Since she values the allowance at ci her payoff then equals br  ci
Hence, seller i’s net payoff Hi from the strictly positive strategy equals
Hi 
|
br  ci if r n m
0i f r   m
(2)
Now consider the alternative described in the theorem. First suppose seller i only
submits an ask ai  0 rather than the ai  0 we had above. Given the strategies
of the other sellers, she now receives the highest bid with certainty. Her payoff thus
equals b1ci This expression is positive if and only if b1  ci But seller i can avoid
making a loss by also submitting a bid Bi  ci In that case, should we have b1  ci
the highest bid will be her own, and the seller effectively buys her own allowance,
thus avoiding a loss. In other cases, the seller is indifferent between whether or not
Bi is successful, since Bi is exactly equal to her valuation of an allowance. Therefore,
using this strategy yields a payoff
Hi 
|
b1  ci if b1  ci
0i f b 1 n c i
(3)
To compare the payoffs in (2) and (3), we have three cases to consider.
1. In case it turns out that both r n m and br  ci, using the strictly positive
strategy yields a negative payoff, while the payoff of using the alternative
strategy is either positive (if also b1  ci), or equal to zero (if this is not the
case).
7 Since both asks and bids are drawn from continuous distributions, there is a probability of 0 that
any two are equal. Therefore, we can use strict inequalities instead of weak inequalities.
8 Note that this is only for ease of exposition seller i does not know the values of the other asks and
bids. The only thing she possibly knows are the equilibrium strategies which map the valuations of the
other participants into asks or bids.
62. If it turns out that r n m and br   ci, the strictly positive strategy yields
br  ci The alternative strategy now yields b1  ci which is equal if r  1
and higher otherwise.
3. If it turns out that r   m the strictly positive strategy yields 0, while the
alternative strategy yields a strictly positive payoff if b1   ci and zero
otherwise.
Thus, in each possible case the seller is at least as well off using the alternative
strategy, than she is using the strictly positive strategy. Moreover, in the ¿rst case,
she is strictly better off using the alternative strategy. Therefore, for seller i the
alternative strategy strictly dominates the strictly positive strategy, which implies that
the latter is not a Nash equilibrium. 
From theorem 3.1, we immediately have
Corollary 3.1 TheequilibriumdescribedbyCason(1993)isnotaNashequilibrium
when sellers can also submit a bid price.
4. Properties of the Appropriate Nash Equilibrium
The result in the previous section suggests that, to ¿nd an equilibrium in this auction,
we have to use an extended strategy space for the sellers. Rather than just submitting
an ask price ai we now consider the case in which a seller submits both an ask ai
a n dab i dp r i c eB i. In this section we will derive some properties of the appropriate
Nash equilibrium in the auction considered. We will show that, in any pure strategy
equilibrium, any seller will either set an ask equal to zero and a strictly positive bid
price, or only a strictly positive ask price. This result is used in the next section to
sketch the derivation of the appropriate Nash equilibrium.
We assume, as in Cason, that every buyer and seller only needs one allowance.
Therefore, for each agent, the valuation of a second allowance equals zero. Also,
assume that ties are broken at random. Note that the payoff to seller i now consists of
two parts: the payoff of (possibly) buying an allowance, and the payoff of (possibly)
sellingone.Sincewenolongerrestrictattentiontotheequilibriumstrategiesdescribed
by Cason, we now explicitly have to take the possibility into account that other
sellers set an ask price 0, and/or a positive bid price as well. Suppose that, among the
N  1 other sellers, Nb submit a bid price, and Na submit an ask price. Among the
other sellers who are submitting an ask price, z set ask price zero. The other market
participants thus submit a total of Q  Nb bids, and a total of Na asks. Order all bids
7of the participants other than i such that b1   b2    bQ￿N bOrder all asks,
including that of seller i, such that 0  a1  a2  a z na z￿1 aN a 9
De¿ne the marginal bidder m as the one with the lowest successful bid, again not
taking the bid by seller i into account, as in (1). If seller i submits a bid, we denote
it by Bi.D e ¿ ne the series ;1  ; 2 ;Q￿N b￿1which orders all bids when Bi is




j : ; j  aj
k
 (4)
We ¿rst prove the following lemma
Lemma 4.1 When Bi  ai and ai is successful, then Bi cannot be successful.
PROOF.W h e n a i is successful, we have ai n aM By de¿nition of the marginal
bidder, we have aM ; MThus Bi  ai n aM ; MBut Bi ; Mimplies that Bi
is not successful. 
Also,
Lemma 4.2 When ai n Bi and Bi is not successful, then ai is successful.
PROOF.W h e n B i is not successful, we necessarily have Bi n ;M￿1 Since, by
de¿nition, aM￿1  ; M￿ 1we have ai n Bi n ;M￿1  aM￿1 But ai  aM￿1 implies
that ai is among the M successful bids. 
We can now prove
Theorem 4.1 I fs e l l e ris u b m i t sa n yb i dB ithen we necessarily have ai n Bi n
ci
PROOF. To prove this theorem, we compare seller i’s payoff when setting some
Bi  ai with her payoff when only setting the same ask ai without submitting a
Bi  ai We will show that using the second strategy strictly dominates using the
¿rst one. That implies that submitting a bid Bi c a no n l yb ep a r to fa ne q u i l i b r i u m
9 The weak inequality az n az￿1 in this series implies that i has the option to set an ask price equal
to zero (in which case a total of z  1 sellers set ask zero, thus 0  a1  az￿1 az￿2)o ra
strictly positive ask (and we have az  az￿1).
8strategy when Bi o ai It is then easy to see that, necessarily, we have Bi n ci as
well.
First suppose seller i only submits some ask price ai Then the marginal bidder is m
as de¿ned in (1). As was the case in the previous section, r is the rank of ask ai.I f
the ask is successful, it yields price br which is the bid matched to seller i’s ask. The
payoff to seller i equals that given in (2):10
Hi 
|
br  ci if r n m
0i f r   m
 (2)
We now derive seller i’s payoff when she submits an ask price ai and a bid Bi with
ai   Bi In that case the marginal bidder is M,a sd e ¿ ned in (4). When submitting a
bid Bi  ai several things can now happen.
1. When the bid Bi is successful, we have Bi o ;M. From lemma 4.1, ai cannot
be successful, thus r   M which implies r   m s i n c ew ee i t h e rh a v e
Mmor M  m  111 Hence, the seller buys an additional allowance
which she values at zero. The payoff of seller i then equals Bi
2. If bid Bi is not successful, Bi ; M Note that the number of successful
bidderswhen Bi is not taken into account, is equal to the number ofsuccessful
bidders when Bi is taken into account. Thus M  m We have two subcases
(a) First suppose ai is successful, hence r n M and thus r n m Since
the seller’s own bid Bi is not sucessful, ask ai is still matched with br
Only an allowance is sold and none is bought, which implies a payoff of
br  ci
(b) Next, suppose that ai is not successful. In that case, an allowance is
neither bought nor sold, and the payoff is 0.





br  ci if r n m
Bi if r   m and Bi o ;M
0o t h e r w i s e
 (5)
10 Since in the case considered here ai   Bi o 0 we do not have to take the possibility of ties into
account.
11 This can be seen as follows. The value m denotes the marginal bidder when bid Bi is not taken into
account, whereas M is the marginal bidder when Bi is taken into account. Introducing an extra bidder
either leaves the total amount of successful bidders unchanged, or it increases the number of successful
bidders by 1. Therefore, either M  m or M  m  1
9Comparing (2) and (5), we have that submitting only an ask price always weakly
dominates, and is strictly better if it turns out that Bi o ;M. Thus, rather than setting
ab i dB i a ia seller is always better off only submitting the ask ai Hence, in
equilibrium we never have Bi  ai which proves the ¿rst inequality in the theorem.
The inequality Bi n ci is obvious. Since a seller values an allowance at most at ci
it never makes sense to submit a bid higher than this value, thus Bi n ci Combined
with the previous result, we thus have ai n Bi n ci if a bid Bi is submitted. 
We now have
Theorem 4.2 If seller i submits any bid Bi then it is a dominant strategy to set
ai  0
PROOF. We will show that when seller i submits a bid Bi then setting ai  0
yields a higher payoff than setting any ai such that 0  ai n Bi From theorem 4.1,
we know that we can disregard the option ai   Bi
We de¿ne a ranking 
 ;1 o 
 ;2  as follows
















 ; j reÀects the expected value of the bid matched to the j-th lowest (and
possibly tied) ask aj.
We have several cases to consider.
1. First assume the bid Bi is successful, i.e. Bi o ;M. Submitting ai  0 yields

 ;1  Bi, and submitting ai   0 yields Bi if ai is not successful, and at most
;z￿1  Bi if ai is successful. Since ;z￿1  
 ;1, it is a dominant strategy to set
ai  0.
2. Second assume that Bi is not successful, hence Bi ; M. Submitting ai  0
yields 
 ;1  ci Any other ask ai n Bi will be successful, because of lemma
4.2, and yields a payoff of at most ;z￿1  ci Again, it is a dominant strategy
to set ai  0

Theorem 4.3 If seller i sets ai  0 then she will always set some Bi   0
10PROOF.W e n o w d e ¿ ne 
 bj  1
z￿1
3z￿1
k￿1 bk for j n z  1a n d
 b j b j for j  
z  1. Again, M is the marginal bidder when the bid of seller i is also taken into
account, as de¿ned by (4). First note that only setting ai  0 always yields a payoff
of Hi  
 b1  ci Now consider what happens if seller i sets a bid Bi as well. There
are three possibilities to consider.
1. Suppose Bi ; MIn that case, seller i’s bid is simply not successful and we
h a v eap a y o f fo f
 b 1c i
2. Considerthecaseinwhich Bi o ;Mbut Bi  bz￿1 Here,bid Bi issuccessful,
but it is not among the z  1 highest bids that are matched to sellers with an
ask price of 0 Seller i’s payoff now equals 
 b1  Bi
3. Finally, Bi   bz￿1 Again, Bi is successful. But now, it also changes the
expected revenue of setting ask price zero. Note that this expected revenue
equals the average value of the z  1 highest bids. Compared to the case in
which seller i did not bid, bz￿1 now drops out of the z1 highest bids, and is









 b1  ci if Bi ; M





z￿1  Bi if Bi   bz￿1
(7)
With only ai  0 we had an expected payoff of 
 b1  ci Therefore, any bid Bi  ci
improves upon this strategy. In the ¿rst case, both strategies yield the same payoff.
In the second case, submitting a bid yields a higher payoff since Bi  ci In the third
case, since Bi  bz￿1   0 expected payoff is higher as well. 
We have now prove the following result:
Theorem 4.4 In equilibrium, every seller i either sets an ask ai  0 a n dab i d
price Bi + 0ci] or only an ask ai   0
PROOF. Given all the theorems proven above, the only thing left to prove is that
any seller i prefers to do any of the two options described in this theorem, rather than
refrain from participating in the auction altogether. Not participating yields 0. Setting
an ask ai  ci never yields a negative payoff (since a seller only sells only when the
bid br to which she is matched has br o ai), whereas there is a positive probability of
11making a strictly positive pro¿t. Thus, any seller i prefers to set an ask ci rather than
dropping out of the auction. 
Insection3,weshowedthatasellercanalwaysimproveupontheequilibriumdescribed
in Cason by submitting an ask ai  0T h i sd o e sn o ti m p l y ,h o w e v e r ,t h a ti nt h eN a s h
equilibrium every seller will actually set an ask ai  0. When other sellers are also
following this strategy, setting ai  0 no longer implies that seller iis matched with
the highest bid b1 When z other sellers are submitting an ask equal to zero as well,
the expected value of the bid to which seller i’s ask is matched equals the average
value of the z  1 highest bids. This expected value can be lower than seller i’s own
valuation ci and/or her own bid Bi Setting Bi  ci no longer guarantees a non-
negative pay-off, as was the case in the proof of theorem 3.1.
5. Deriving the Equilibrium
In this section, we give a tentative derivation of the appropriate equilibrium in the
auction considered. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full derivation. A
general solution will be very hard to ¿nd, given the fact that we have an asymmetric
auction with a stochastic number of participants, both of which are notoriously hard
to solve. Therefore, we make some highly simplifying assumptions, to give a taste
for the proper analysis.
First, we consider the case in which all sellers set an ask price equal to zero. The
analysis is then almost identical to a normal auction, with n k Q  N bidders Q
w h od on o to w na na l l o w a n c e ,a n dt r yt ob u yi t ,a n dNwho do own an allowance,
but have offered it at ask price zero. For simplicity, we also assume that the effect of
the own bid on the expected price for which the own license is sold, is not taken into
account by the sellers.
In general,12 in an auction with nbidders, whose valuation follows some cumulative





for bidder i of submitting a bid bi given that his valuation is )iequals














12 The discussion here closely follows Wolfstetter (1996).





In equilibrium, all bidders use the same bidding strategy b‘)i It can be shown that
this bidding strategy is strictly increasing in )i The fact that the goods are awarded
to the highest bidders therefore implies that, in equilibrium, they are awarded to the















thus the equilibrium bid strategy is given by





With a simple single auction, in which only one unit of the good is sold, it is easy to
see that I)i  F)in￿1 and we get the well-known result13




which implies that the bid of bidder i is equal to the expected value of the second-
highest bid, conditional on bidder i’ sb i db e i n gt h eh i g h e s t .I na na u c t i o ni nw h i c ht h e
goods are awarded to the N highest bidders, who all pay their own bid, we have that
the probability of winning equals the probability of )i being among the N highest of
n independent draws of a random variable with density function F This equals the
13 See e.g. McAfee and McMillan (1987)







[F)i]j [1  F)i]n￿1￿j  (16)
hence














j!￿n￿1￿j￿!F)ij 1  F)i
n￿1￿j
 (17)
Thus the bid of bidder i equals the expected value of the (N  1)st highest bid,
conditional on his own valuation )i being the N-th highest.
To determine the expected payoff to a seller with valuation )i of submitting the bid
b‘)i and setting the ask ai  0 we proceed as follows. Note that the expected
payoff of setting ai  0 equals the average value of the N highest bids minus the










with I)ias de¿nedin(16),b ‘)ias de¿ne di n( 1 7) ,a nd b ‘
Ntheexpectedaverageof
the N highest bids. De¿ne Bb as the probability density function of the equilibrium
bids (thus Bb  Pb o b‘)i given the distribution of )i which is F)i). The
value  b‘
N is then the expected value of the average of the N highest order statistics of
n drawings from the probability distribution Bb.
So far, however, we have assumed that all sellers set an ask price zero and a positive
bid price. This is not necessarily the best thing to do. Suppose all the others are
following such a strategy. The payoff of doing so as well then equals (18). Only
submitting a strictly positive ask ai however, then yields the N th highest bid for
sure. Denote theexpected value ofthe Nth highestbid as EbNTheexpectedpayoff
of this alternative is
U‘ai  EbN  )i  P bN   ai (19)






j!n  1  j!
[Bb]
j [1  Bb]
n￿1￿j  (20)
14 For more on order statistics see e.g. Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974).
14and





which can be used to ¿nd the optimal ai to set.15 T h eb e s tp o s s i b l es t r a t e g yi sf o u n d
by comparing the payoffs in (18) and (21). Yet, any seller also has to take into account
thattheothersellersfacethesameproblem,andthatwhentheydecidetosetapositive
ask rather than a positive bid and an ask price zero, the decision problem they face
also changes. A full description of the equilibrium thus implies
1. A speci¿cation of the probability density function of the bidders’ valuations,
 and sellers’ costs H
2. An endogenously derived equilibrium set S which is a subset of the support
of H that speci¿es which sellers will not submit an ask ai  0 and bid
Bi   0 but rather only an ask ai   0
3. Given the set S the expected number of de facto bidders and sellers in the
auction, plus the proper (truncated) probability densities H) and H)) for
sellers who, respectively, offer an allowance at price zero plus a positive bid,
and those that only offer a positive ask.
4. Given the information in 3, equilibrium bid and ask strategies for the three
groups of agents.
It seems virtually impossible to ¿nd an analytical solution for this16. Also, it is not
guaranteed that an equilibrium in pure strategies does exist.
6. Conclusion
Cason (1993) argued that the auction the EPA used to start the market for sulfur
allowances, is not ef¿cient. The set-up of the auction gives both buyers and sellers an
incentive to understate their valuation of an allowance. Therefore, equilibrium prices
aretoolow,andthemarketisnotef¿cient. Inthispaper, weshowedthattheincentives
15 When seller i is the only one setting an ask ai   0 which is the case considered in the text, then it
is easy to see that it is optimal to set ai  ci Setting a lower ai implies that this seller also has to sell
when ai  bN  ci which causes a loss. Setting a higher ai implies that when ci  bN  ai she will
not sell, although it would have been pro¿table to do so. However, when other sellers also decide to set
a strictly positive ask price, this argument no longer holds, and the optimal ai has to be derived along
the lines described in the main text.
16 In fact, it even turned out to be impossible to derive an equilibrium for the simplest numerical
example conceivable.
15in this particular auction are even more perverse than Cason suggested. In particular,
we showed that sellers have an incentive to set their ask price equal to zero, while
simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid at the same time. We
also showed that the proper equilibrium in this auction, when this possibility is taken
into account, is impossible to ¿nd. What we do show is that, if an equilibrium exists,
sellers either set only a positive ask price, or an ask price equal to zero, and a positive
bid as well.
As far as we know, no one has ever simultaneously submitted a bid and an ask at
the EPA auction.17 Nor has this strategy ever been suggested in the literature about
the EPA auction. Also, other literature on auctions does not study the possibility. The
latter is probably due to the fact that only in a peculiar setup like that of the EPA
auction, it is pro¿table to follow such a strategy.
We now know that the EPA auction was a failure, in the sense that hardly any private
parties sold allowances at the auctions. As a result, it took several years before an
ef¿cient market in sulfur allowances developed. Cason (1993) suggested that the
main reason for this was that, given equilibrium strategies for buyers and sellers,
equilibrium prices are too low, making the market inef¿cient. Our analysis shows
that in the true equilibrium, the incentives for sellers in the auction are even more
perverse, shedding even more doubt on the ef¿ciency of such an auction. Therefore,
it does not come as a surprise that potential sellers preferred to bypass the auctions
altogether, and waited for an ef¿cient market to develop.
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17Year of Vintage Offered Privately Bid for Sold Private
auction yeara by EPA offered tradesb
1993 1995 50,000 95,010 321,354 50,010 Not
1993 2000 100,000 30,500 283,506 100,000 available
1994 1995 50,000 58,001 294,354 50,000 900,000c
1994 2000 25,000 50,000 110,489 25,400
1994 2001 100,000 47,000 489,399 100,800
1995 1995 150,000 8,306 255,371 50,600 1,900,000
1995 2001 25,000 7,000 70,286 25,400
1995 2002 100,000 7,000 236,928 100,400
1996 1996 150,000 8,000 911,735 150,000 4,400,000
1996 2002 25,000 7,000 148,026 25,000
1996 2003 100,000 7,000 404,634 100,000
1997 1997 150,000 0 1,224,582 150,000 7,900,000
1997 2003 25,000 0 128,543 25,000
1997 2004 100,000 0 553,406 100,000
1998 1998 150,000 0 767,097 150,000 Not
1998 2005 125,000 0 509,009 125,000 Available
a year from which the auctioned allowances can be used.
b trade between economically distinct organizations in a given year.
c April to December.
Source: EPA website
Table 1: The market for SO2 allowances.
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